Framing Information Security Budget Requests to Influence Investment Decisions by Beebe, Nicole L et al.
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 35 Article 7
9-2014
Framing Information Security Budget Requests to
Influence Investment Decisions
Nicole L. Beebe
University of Texas at San Antonio, nicole.beebe@utsa.edu
Diana K. Young
University of Texas at San Antonio
Frederick R. Chang
21CT, Inc.
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Beebe, Nicole L.; Young, Diana K.; and Chang, Frederick R. (2014) "Framing Information Security Budget Requests to Influence
Investment Decisions," Communications of the Association for Information Systems: Vol. 35 , Article 7.
DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.03507
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol35/iss1/7
  
Volume 34 Article 7 
Framing Information Security Budget Requests to Influence Investment 
Decisions 
Nicole L. Beebe 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
Nicole.beebe@utsa.edu 
 
Diana K. Young 
University of Texas at San Antonio 
 
Frederick R. Chang 
21CT, Inc. 
 
Researchers studying the economics of information security have traditionally focused on the use of rational choice 
decision models for evaluating investment alternatives. Security investment decisions involve risk, and several 
researchers have noted that risk-related decisions often violate the fundamental principles of rational choice 
decision models. This study tests the prevailing presumption in published research that information security 
investment decisions are made in an entirely rational manner. We empirically validated our hypothesis that 
information security investment decision makers in fact exhibit preference reversals when faced with competing 
budget alternatives involving risk. Specifically, we observed the framing effect under prospect theory, which 
suggests that individuals exhibit unique risk attitudes when evaluating gain-related and loss-related risk decisions. 
Accordingly, we argue that existing, widely accepted rational choice and economic models for information security 
investments need to be supplemented with risk perception measurement and account for individual level decision 
biases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The pursuit of information security is concerned with protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information systems against adverse events and exploitation of system vulnerabilities. To achieve this goal, 
organizations implement controls. Controls include technologies, human resources, processes, training, and other 
initiatives. Recent research indicates that implemented controls may be reducing the effectiveness of certain security 
exploits (Richardson, 2011). Fewer organizations are reporting incidents of device theft, insider abuse, denial of 
service, financial fraud, password sniffing, and wireless network exploits. However, incidents involving botnets, 
malware infections, and phishing are increasing, which indicates that organizations need to implement additional 
controls and/or improve their existing controls to thwart these and other newly identified security threats.   
Efforts aimed at improving an organization’s security generally require money to fund the development of necessary 
controls. However, Richardson (2011) found that a third of the 351 security practitioners surveyed by the Computer 
Security Institute (CSI) felt that the organization they worked for underfunded information security efforts. Individuals 
included in this sample represented a wide range of industry sectors, organizational sizes, and job titles. 
Furthermore, other research indicates that both information technology (IT) and information security budgets have 
declined in recent years (Stöwer & Kraft, 2012). Accordingly, two key challenges facing information security 
professionals are: 1) determining how much they should spend on security initiatives, and 2) convincing upper 
management to fund the necessary initiatives.  
Rational choice and economic models have been developed to help decision makers determine the optimal amount 
they should spend to protect information assets (Bodin, Gordon, & Loeb, 2005; Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, & 
Raghunathan, 2004a; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004b; Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, & Yue, 2008; Gordon 
& Loeb, 2002; Herath & Herath, 2008; Wang, Chaudhury, & Rao, 2008). These models focus on calculating the 
expected utility of a security initiative by comparing the resulting quantitative benefits to the costs of implementing 
and maintaining the security controls. However, security benefits are difficult to quantify because the benefit is a 
function of loss avoidance. Accordingly, benefit quantification inherently depends on an accurate and reliable 
method to determine the probability of a loss occurring, but actuarial data to support such a process is lacking. Many 
senior managers are cognizant of this difficulty, which then informs their perceptions of information security budget 
justifications and subsequent budget decisions. Accordingly, some practitioners use a modified approach that 
examines costs and benefits but places less emphasis on the formal quantification of benefits (Gordon & Loeb, 
2006). In addition, some information security practitioners rely on past years’ budgets. Reliance on past years’ 
budgets is commonly criticized in the industry because, while expedient, it is important to fully consider and 
incorporate the upcoming year’s business goals, which may vary from the previous year’s goals. Many contend that 
the budgeting process should be an ongoing process throughout the year rather than an annual event because, 
otherwise, the budget fails to evolve. That concern is compounded when the budget is substantially derived from the 
previous year’s budget. 
Once an investment request has been developed, information security professionals face the additional challenge of 
convincing higher-level managers that the initiative is necessary and should be funded. Top-level management 
consider information security investment requests amid competing funding requests across their organizations and 
they often have to make trade-off decisions amidst limited budgets. Accordingly, many factors, including qualitative 
considerations, impact managers’ investment decisions (Gordon, 1989). Whether the factors are qualitative or 
quantitative, information security investment research to date contends and assumes that the eventual investment 
decisions are rational. 
However, long-standing behavioral and decision making research contends that individuals exhibit preference 
reversals that violate the axioms of rational choice models when making decisions that are characterized by risk (the 
potential for loss) and uncertainty (the probability of an outcome is unknown) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977). To explain these pervasive inconsistencies, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have 
proposed prospect theory, which they characterize as an approximate description of the processes individuals use to 
evaluate risky prospects. The theory contends that individuals valuate risk-related options using a two-step 
process. In the first step, individuals apply heuristics to simplify their understanding of their alternative choices. While 
these simplifying rules work well in some contexts, they can lead to deviations from rational choice models when 
evaluating risky prospects. In the second step, individuals evaluate the expected utility of each prospect and select 
the option that they perceive to provide the greatest utility. During this evaluation process, prospect theory contends 
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that individuals apply an asymmetric S-shaped value function (Figure 1). For each prospect, the value function is 
multiplied by the outcome’s probability of occurrence and its value. As the slope of this value function is more 
extreme for losses, individuals perceive the derived negative utility of a loss to be more extreme than the derived 
positive utility resulting from a gain of the same relative size. 
   
Figure 1. Prospect Theory Value Function (Adapted from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
 
Central to prospect theory is the concept of framing, which is the manner in which a statement or question is 
worded, such that the wording influences the “decision maker’s conception of the acts, contingencies, and 
outcomes” of the given options (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). Many studies, by Tversky, Kahneman and 
others, have replicated Tversky and Kahneman’s work and have shown that individuals largely prefer risk-averse 
options when evaluating gains and risk-seeking options when evaluating losses. Prospect theory is considered the 
most influential of all descriptive decision theories (Crozier & Ranyard, 1997) and has been used to study risk-
related decisions in a variety of disciplines (Church, Libby, & Ping, 2008; Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 
2008; Edwards, Miles, & von Winterfeld, 2007; Latham & Braun, 2009; Wagner, Hennig-Thurau, & Rudolph, 2009). 
For example, Church et al. (2008) found that, when evaluating incentive-based contracts, individuals strongly 
preferred bonus-framed versus penalty-framed contracts. Similarly, Wagner et al. (2009) found that demotions from 
hierarchical loyalty program had a stronger negative impact on customers’ loyalty intentions than did promotions to 
such programs of an equivalent size.   
There is little certainty in information security. Some say the only certainty is “when, not if”—that is, that all 
organizations will be compromised at some point. That certainty gives way to new uncertainties, however, regarding 
the tangible and intangible impact of a potential compromise. Accordingly, information security investment decisions 
involve risk. Over-investment risks dollars that could be spent operationally on other projects. Under-investment 
risks information security, productivity, and stakeholder confidence in the organization.   
Certainly, the organizational decision making process pertaining to resource investment is complex and typically 
transcends the singular individual. We do not contend the information security investment decision is an individual-
level decision in most cases. However, since individual decision makers are significant input variables and indeed 
influence the organizational decision, individual-level decision making biases are important to consider.  
Past normative decision making models for information security may be improved by accounting for the impact of 
individual risk perceptions and biases on otherwise rational decisions. This research empirically investigated 
whether individual information security investment decision makers exhibit risk preference reversals when evaluating 
budget alternatives involving risk. This is important since prevailing economic decision making models for 
information security do not account for, nor  acknowledge, the potential for preference reversals. The ability to model 
decision biases and moderate their effect in a decision making model is important when the inputs to the model are 
subjective in nature. Many of the existing information security prescriptive models require subjective estimating 
critical input parameters because quantified values that are known to be reliable and valid simply do not exist. For 
example, some models require estimating the percentage of dishonest users in the organization, the value received 
by a hacker from breaking into a system, or the penalty for an intrusion.  
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Specifically, we test the framing effect under prospect theory, which suggests that individuals exhibit unique risk 
attitudes when evaluating gain-related and loss-related risk decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We focus on 
framing effects for two reasons: 1) to demonstrate that information security professionals do deviate from rational 
choice models when evaluating security related investment decisions, and 2) to show that investment requestors 
can influence decision makers’ behavior by simply changing the wording of their requests.  
Prospect theory research has shown many times and many contexts that, when faced with risk-related decisions 
that are framed as gains, individuals usually prefer more risk-averse options. In contrast, individuals usually prefer 
riskier options when decision choices are framed as losses. Yet, the absence of individual decision bias variables in 
extant information security investment models suggests the field may view the decision as entirely rational. Further, 
while the information security investment decision is often an organizational-level decision in larger organizations, it 
is still heavily influenced by individual decision making biases of individual contributors. 
Based on this and the fact that top managers consider both qualitative and quantitative factors when making 
investment decisions (Gordon, 1989), we contend that the framing of information security investment requests 
influences the investment decisions made by top management. For information security personnel, the implication is 
that the age-old “fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD)” strategy of scaring top management into investing in 
information security may actually have the opposite effect than was intended. Nonetheless, organizations still 
frequently evaluate investment options relative to vulnerabilities and the likelihood that the vulnerabilities will be 
exploited (Buck, Das, & Hanf, 2008; Stöwer & Kraft, 2012)—the negative impact of not investing, rather than the 
positive impact of investing. When proposing security investment options, information security personnel have the 
option to discuss the impact of the investment (or lack thereof) in terms of the assets that will be protected, or in 
terms of the assets that will be lost. For researchers, this may explain some of the error involved with purely rational-
choice and/or economic models. For top management, the implication is that decisions and support systems may be 
improved when the possibility of preference reversal is realized and accounted for.  
According to rational choice economic models, investment framing should have no impact on decision makers’ 
preferences among investment options. However, prospect theory research has shown that framing does influence 
risk-related decisions. To address this issue, we conducted a scenario-based empirical study of the information 
security investment decisions made by information security managers and executives.   
II. BIASES IN DECISION MAKING 
Past research indicates that high-stakes decisions involving uncertainty “fall prey to a wide range of potentially 
harmful biases” (Kunreuther et al., 2002, p. 259) that result from heuristics that are applied during the editing and 
evaluation phases of the decision making process. Specifically, Bazerman (2006) notes that the availability, 
representativeness, and affect heuristics can significantly bias perceptions regarding decision options.  
The availability heuristic refers to a mental shortcut individuals use to assess the frequency of an event based on 
how readily information regarding similar event instances can be retrieved from memory. While this unconscious 
process allows individuals to quickly assess event likelihood, it can also result in biased decision processes when 
evaluating events where risk is involved. For example, Bazerman (2006) notes that applying the availability heuristic 
can result in frequency over-estimation of extremely vivid and/or very recent events, frequency under-estimation of 
events that are difficult to recall or understand, and over-estimation of event correspondence when the decision 
maker has past experience involving event co-occurrence. In terms of information security investment decisions, 
applying this heuristic can result in decision makers greatly underestimating the probability of security events 
resulting from newly identified or unusual threats, while overestimating the probability of widely discussed, highly 
destructive events.    
The representative heuristic refers to the unconscious process of comparing an event’s traits to a previously formed 
stereotype, and, when correspondence is found, assuming that the stereotype is representative of the current event. 
Applying this heuristic can cause the decision maker to ignore information regarding the commonality, or base rate, 
of the current event and the sample size that resulted in the current event. Finally, when applying the representative 
heuristic, individuals tend to lose sight of the fact that extreme events generally regress toward the mean in 
subsequent sampling. In terms of information security investment decisions, applying the representative heuristic 
can result in decision makers under or overestimating the financial impact of multiple security events resulting from 
the same type of threat. For instance, if the decision maker experienced a prior malware infection that caused little 
damage and was easily eradicated, applications of the heuristic could cause the decision maker to underestimate 
the impact of a newly detected infection.  
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Finally, the affective heuristic refers to the unconscious process of relying on one’s emotional response regarding an 
event to guide decision making. Applying the heuristic simplifies the decision process by allowing the decision maker 
to follow their gut instinct rather than conducting a thorough analysis of the problem domain; however, such a 
decision strategy can result in significant deviations from rational choice models. In terms of information security 
investment decisions, the heuristic can result in decision makers overreacting to highly emotional security events.  
III. PROSPECT THEORY 
Prospect theory provides a simplified description of the way individuals evaluate risky prospects (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Numerous tests of the theory show that, 
when individuals are faced with risk-related decisions, they exhibit different preference patterns for gain-related and 
loss-related decisions. Specifically, individuals generally choose riskier alternatives when options are discussed in 
terms of losses, and choose less-risky alternatives when options are discussed in terms of gains.  
In one particular test, subjects were shown a short vignette describing the spread of a deadly disease and asked to 
choose between two hypothetical programs to combat the disease (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Half of the 
subjects were presented with a set of two program options that were both positively framed (i.e., lives saved) and 
reflected equal expected utility (200 people saved and 400 people die), but one involved more certainty than the 
other. The other half of the subjects were presented a set of program options that were negatively framed (i.e., lives 
lost). Again, both options reflected equal expected utility, but one involved more certainty than the other. Table 1 
provides the scenario vignette used in the study and the positively and negatively framed option pairs. 
Table 1: Classic Prospect Theory Vignette and Framed Options 
(Adapted from Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
Vignette: Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows. Which of 
the two programs do you favor?  
Positively framed options: 
 
Program A: 200 people will be saved. (72%) 
 
Program B: There is a 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no 
one will be saved. (28%) 
Negatively framed options: 
 
Program C: 400 people will die. (22%) 
 
Program D: There is a 1/3 probability that nobody 
will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will 
die. (78%) 
 
According to rational choice decision making theory, if respondents evaluated the options in a completely rational 
manner (i.e., the wording had no impact on choice), no significant difference in the positively and negatively framed 
response patterns should be detected. However, the study’s results show that 72 percent of respondents who were 
shown the positively framed options preferred program A over program B, while 78 percent of respondents who 
were shown the negatively framed options preferred program D over program C (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
When faced with positively framed options of equal utility, respondents preferred the more risk-averse option. Saving 
200 lives with certainty was strongly preferred over the 1/3 probability of saving 600 lives coupled with the 2/3 
probability of saving no lives. However, when faced with negatively framed options, respondents exhibited a different 
risk posture: they were risk seeking. When negatively framed, subjects strongly preferred the 1/3 probability that no 
one die coupled with the 2/3 probability that all 600 people die over the more certain scenario of 400 people dying.  
Bazerman (2006) notes that framing may explain consumers’ propensity for buying insurance and extended 
warranties even when the cost of such plans exceeds the expected utility. Bazerman describes a study in which half 
of the subjects were asked to choose between a low probability loss of a very large amount or a certain loss of a 
much smaller amount, while the other half were asked to choose between the same low probability loss of a very 
large amount and an insurance premium costing the smaller amount. Interestingly, participants in the second group 
chose the insurance premium much more frequently than members of the first group chose the certain loss. 
Bazerman argues that social norms favoring insurance coverage coupled with the availability and vividness of 
information regarding large, out-of-pocket expenditures that can result from being uninsured cause individuals to 
overinvest in insurance and extended warranties.  
III. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
To empirically determine whether the framing of information security investment requests influences decision 
makers’ preferences, we developed and administered an online survey instrument. Following the example of the 
classic deadly disease study, the developed instrument contained a short vignette, two investment options, and a 
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request for respondents to indicate which of the two options they preferred. Wording of the vignette closely matched 
that of the deadly disease study. In the instrument, we randomized the framing selection of investment options so 
that roughly half of the respondents were shown positively framed options, while the other half were shown 
negatively framed options. In addition, we randomized the order of investment options in frames. All investment 
options presented possessed equal expected utility. Table 2 shows the vignette and option sets included in the 
survey instrument. 
Table 2: Information Security Investment Vignette and Framed Options 
Vignette: Imagine that your company is allocating financial resources to its information security program. 
Without such investment your company is expected to experience a $600,000 financial impact (asset 
loss). Note: Your assets include financial resources, intellectual property, organizational reputation, 
personnel time, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of your hardware, software, and data.  
 
Several alternative information security programs to combat the overall threat have been proposed.  
Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows. Please 
choose your preferred information security program from the set of two choices. 
Positively framed options: 
 
Program A: $200,000 worth of assets will be 
saved with certainty. 
 
Program B: There is a one-third probability that 
$600,000 worth of assets will be saved, and a two-
thirds probability that no assets will be saved. 
Negatively framed options: 
 
Program A: $400,000 worth of assets will be lost 
with certainty. 
 
Program B: There is a one-third probability that no 
assets will be lost, and a two-thirds probability that 
$600,000 worth of assets will be lost. 
 
The target population for the study included individuals who have determined or influenced the amount budgeted for 
information security at the organizational level. Due to this requirement, target subjects could be employed at 
different organizational levels. Accordingly, we anticipated a wide range of participants from C-level executives to 
security practitioners.  
We sent invitations to participate in the study (via a link to the online survey instrument) to approximately 600 
individuals. We do not know the exact number because it involved members of two professional 
organizations/communities that do not disclose their exact membership roster or size. One was a local InfraGard 
chapter (http://www.infragard.net) in a large, metropolitan city in the southwestern United States. The other was the 
Cyber Security and Information Security Subject Matter Expert (SME) group, sponsored by the U.S. Government. 
We estimated membership at the time of the invitation to be 375 and 125, respectively. Additionally, we sent 
personal invitations to approximately 100 local area business leaders who participated in an information security 
training program held in the Southwest US and to our professional contacts. 
All email messages specified that respondents needed to have experience determining or influencing the amount 
budgeted for information security at the organizational level. In the event that a message recipient did not have that 
level of experience, the email contained a request for the recipient to forward the message on to an individual who 
did. To ensure that all survey respondents met this requirement, the first question presented asked: “Have you 
determined the amount, or influenced the decision, of how much money is budgeted for information security at an 
organizational level?”. Respondents who replied yes to this question were then presented with the vignette (Table 2) 
and a set of either positively or negatively framed investment options. Respondents who replied no to the above 
question were thanked for their interest in the investigation and exited from the survey. 
We obtained 51 responses—a 8.5 percent response rate. This is lower than desired, but not lower than expected for 
a behavioral science study concerning a sensitive topic and targeting higher-level personnel. Past research 
suggests information security is a difficult subject to tackle via survey because respondents consider it a sensitive 
topic area for their organization (Kotulic & Clark, 2004).  Of the collected responses, 44 were complete and usable 
for the study. Twenty of the usable responses were from respondents shown positively framed options (assets 
saved), whereas the remaining 24 respondents received negatively framed options (assets lost).  
Thirty-one (31) of the 44 usable responses came from respondents who provided voluntary demographic data. 
Relative to the 31 respondents who provided demographic information, the gender split in the sample was 26 males 
and five females. Although this is not balanced, it reflects the skewed gender distribution in the information security 
population. The average respondent age was 50 years old. Respondents had 18 years of information security 
experience on average, so our findings reflect the opinions of highly experienced professionals. Further, 
respondents had, on average, 12 years of experience directly determining and/or influencing information security 
  
Volume 34 Article 7 
139 
budgets, so their opinions are likely to be very insightful. The sample contained individuals from a wide range of job 
titles, industries, and organization sizes, which Figures 2-4 depict. 
 
Figure 2: Respondent Title 
 
 
Figure 3: Respondent Industry 
 
  
140 
Volume 34 Article 7 
 
Figure 4: Organization Revenue 
IV. FINDINGS 
As Table 3 shows, 70 percent of individuals who were shown positively framed information security option choices 
preferred the more certain option of Program A. In contrast, 83 percent of individuals who were shown negatively 
framed option choices preferred the riskier option of Program B. To test the statistical significance of these findings, 
we ran Pearson chi-squared tests of independence to determine whether the differences in positively framed and 
negatively framed preferences could be due to chance. Results yielded a χ
2 
statistic
 
of 12.836 with a significance of 
p < .001. 
Table 3. Results 
 
Frame 
Selected option A: 
certain outcome 
Selected option B: 
uncertain outcome 
Positive  70%* 30%* 
Negative 17%* 83%* 
* χ
2 
= 12.836, p < 0.001 
 
From these findings, we can observe that decision makers are inclined to take more risks when information security 
budget requests are framed negatively in terms of the loss-based financial impact to the organization if the 
requested information security investment is not made. Here, the assets lost are in terms of financial resources, 
intellectual property, organizational reputation, personnel time, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the 
organization’s hardware, software, and data. Decision makers who are willing to take more information security risks 
will presumably invest less in information security. 
 
The survey responses validated our hypothesis that individual information security investment decision makers and 
information security professionals who influence those decision makers are susceptible to framing biases and do 
indeed exhibit preference reversals when faced with budget alternatives involving risk. When faced with risk-related 
decisions positively framed in terms of gains, subjects demonstrated a statistically significant propensity toward risk-
aversion. They showed a strong preference for more probabilistically certain options over less certain options. In 
contrast, when faced with risk-related decisions negatively framed in terms of losses, subjects demonstrated a 
statistically significant propensity toward risk-seeking behavior. Here, they showed a strong preference for less 
probabilistically certain options over more certain ones.  
We believe this is an important finding because it may partially explain why nearly one in three security practitioners 
believe that the organization they work for under-funds information security efforts (Richardson, 2011). Based on 
their knowledge of and constant focus on the information security threat landscape, practitioners are keenly aware of 
the extent and severity of many information security risks, and of the negative consequences associated with those 
risks. The cognitive biases resulting from both the availability and representativeness of this information may cause 
practitioners to over-estimate the probability of incident occurrence and thus the risk of negative consequences from 
under-investment. Further, the discussions practitioners engage in are often negatively framed: they are focused on 
prospective losses upon breach rather than prospective gain from security investments. This framing coupled with a 
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biased over-estimate regarding the probability of incident occurrence may in fact lead practitioners to prefer 
alternatives that lead to an over-investment in security controls. At the same time, however, and perhaps because of 
increased perception of such biases over time, many managerial decision makers have come to question the validity 
of the risk data presented to them. This may cause them to be unrealistically optimistic regarding the probability of 
an incident occurrence and result in those individuals preferring alternatives that under-invest in security controls. Of 
course, this interpretation is based purely on post-hoc suppositions and further testing is needed to determine if 
differences in practitioners’ and managers’ biases and perception frames influence their investment opinions. 
Our finding is further significant because negative framing is indeed the way many information security budget 
requests are presented to organizational decision makers (Buck et al., 2008, Stöwer & Kraft, 2012). Information 
security professionals often try to convince top management what the negative impact to the organization will be if 
they do not invest more in information security. In our experience, many senior executives have come to question 
the reliability and validity of quantified risk data that involves either the probability of the threat and/or the impact of 
the threat. That, combined with the observed impact of negative framing on managers’ decision making process in 
the context of risk, means security practitioners may be accomplishing the exact opposite of their goal by using 
negative framing. It serves as a distinct negative bias. Framing the budget request in positive terms—discussing 
what will be protected instead of what will be lost—may garner greater information security investments in 
organizations. Information security practitioners and chief information security officers (CISOs) may find this a 
particularly worthwhile implication of our findings. 
However, maximizing information security investments may not be the optimal investment decision for an 
organization as perceived by its top management. Regardless of potentially competing definitions of what the 
optimal investment between practitioners and mangers is, true investment optimization must overcome human 
decision biases. Accordingly, our findings are important to the organizational decision making process itself. They 
suggest that prevailing information security investment decision models based on rational choice theory and/or 
economic utility models ought to be supplemented with risk perception measurement and subsequently account for 
the influence of individual decision biases. Decision makers’ perception of risk may be formally modeled in decision 
support systems used for budgeting to mitigate the perceived risk bias introduced by individuals estimating 
qualitative budget decision factors.  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Admittedly, the information security investment decision is a part of a much larger and complex budget setting 
process than our vignettes reflect. Anecdotal feedback received during content validation procedures suggests that 
our low response rate may have been influenced by negative opinions regarding our vignette simplicity. However, 
we did not attempt to approximate the actual budget process and decision in the survey. If prospect theory’s framing 
effect is not present in information security investment decisions, then any potential bias due to scenario simplicity 
would equally bias both frames and a significant preference between vignette frames would not be observed. We 
empirically observed strong framing effects in both frames. Further, we know of no theorized connection between 
scenario realism and framing effects, and we preferred to model our vignettes after Kahneman and Tversky’s Nobel 
Prize-winning work and scenario format. Further, we believe we obtained a high quality sample from the perspective 
of level in organizations (>50% of those who provided demographic data were C-level or director-level employees), 
information security experience (18 years on average), and experience making or influencing information security 
investment decisions (12 years on average).  
In sum, we found that high-level decision makers and information security managers influencing those decision 
makers do demonstrate preference reversals when evaluating information security investment alternatives. Whereas 
past literature predominantly focused on rational choice models, our findings suggest that those models could be 
improved by accounting for prospect theory’s framing effects. Our findings suggest that decision makers are typically 
inclined to take more risks when asked to invest in information security to prevent loss-based consequences. Based 
on these findings, we conclude that budget requests positively framed in terms of asset protection might garner 
greater information security investments. We contend that existing information security investment decision models 
ought to be supplemented with risk perception measurements and account for expected decision biases accordingly. 
Future research could empirically explore the following important questions. First, are there conflicting, possibly even 
off-setting biases involved on the part of information security professions requesting the budget allocations and 
senior executives determining resource allocations? In our experience, many senior executives no longer believe 
subjective quantifications of risk probabilities, which may amplify the framing effect. As stated previously, cognitive 
biases of information security professions that may cause them to tend toward negative framing with potentially 
exaggerated risks may in fact amplify top management’s tendency toward risk-seeking behavior when presented 
with negatively framed information security budget request justifications. On the other hand, the incidence of several 
recent, high-profile security breaches may temper that. Further, Bazerman’s (2006) findings regarding consumer 
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insurance purchasing patterns might support the notion that information security professionals may essentially be 
seeking insurance so-to-speak when formulating their budget request. Future research that explores these and other 
biases involved in the information security budget decision making process is needed. It would also be helpful to 
empirically examine the subjectivity—its influences and its variation—among information security professionals in 
estimating parameters required for existing rational choice models based on expected utility theory. This is important 
for modifying existing prescriptive models to account for framing effect bias, and would further signal the importance 
of our findings. Last, future research could examine the impact of neutrally framed budget requests—those that 
discuss both gain and loss prospects. 
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